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THE EVIL OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE*
By I.. NgWton Ro!er, I-L.M., J.D., Washington; D. C.
A corporation is.styled as a "person" in the Constitution of the
United 5tgates and zrrated for a public purpose. The dominion
9f , rporate power is greater than the general public comprehend,
Also the evils which infest these creatures of the law are skilfully
,and §ecrtly destroying the inalienable rights of personal liberty
.while the people are lingering. States have created these cor-
poratipns by special acts of their ].egisLtures tinged deeply with
th@e §tqin of corruptiqn. Specig charters of power oere hrpad
And dangerous, irresponsible an destructive in maqy instacpes.
These charters have nearly ceased to exist and rany of the unljil7
i~td powers are nw conferred, or permitted by ger@ral inqprpora-
tjon laws. Thfese legal provisions of authority in State charters,
by some expressive or permissjye force, evidently, are the sources
of thie prevailing evils qnd proper subject for reform. Even the
isste of c hartes to orpnizations has been promiscuous. It is to
this charter of porpor-te power that many of the grpg evils of
monopoly ,exj tMng in interstate commerce are attributahle: Qov-
-ero.ent pnd business have been united by laws of incorporation
which atgrize, per pit or make possibleg unfair and oppressive
mthods. Origh'l!y charters had no special privileges for power
to own ,stg in other ,cqrporations or the power of transferability
of shar@s of stoph. When the right to transfer shares of stock
began the evil of special privilege had its birth.
Early records §ho'y that in i587 the Portuguese &9vernmient
granted g ,hartq, to a tradipg company. The East India Pom-
pany, a thorized in! i6_o, dring thr reign pf Edwar, VI Wp. f~e
f rst P-99rpqte orggnization to possess this papability to trans-
fer, stock in England, which was q monopqly created by royal
grgnt. This §5pcial privilege was immediately utilize4 in ther
cpOitries. Th@ jDt@h jndia Company yas organized in HplpdA
on the sa @. basis as the English company. France was next in
line to create simnilar corporqtions. These corporations were
* This is the secop. of a series of three arti !es on "The Regulation of
Industrial Corporations" by the author. The first article on "The Ameri-
can Federation of Labor," appeared in the December, 1912, issue. The
last article will appear in the February issue.
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formed to conduct trade between Europe and the Indies and
yielded immense profits. The duration of their charters was
limited in years and renewed for periods of twenty years. The
government shared in the profits as the purposes of the corpora-
tion were in nature of public corporations. The Bank of Eng-
land obtained its first charter in 1694. Eventually the evils of
corporate power appeared in the first quarter of the eighteenth
century in both England and France, all caused by the develop-
ment of numerous fraudulent stock companies. At this period
the great South Sea bubble in England grew and burst. In
England the prohibitory act of 1720 was passed and few corpora-
tions were created till 1741, when the provisions of the act were
extended to the American colonies. Between 1741 and the Amer-
ican Revolution very few corporations appeared till the adoption
of the Constitution. Nearly all the corporations prior to I850
were public in their nature such as banking, railroad, and bridge
companies. At this time there were no general incorporation
laws for purely private purposes in this country. Probably the
first charter having private privileges was granted by England
in I688, incorporating a trading company in Massachusetts which
had power to open and operate mines. The people protested
against this special privilege, arguing that such grant of power
tended to produce a monopoly and enhance prices of mining pro-
ducts resulting in oppression upon the general public. The view
of monopolistic power and restraint is not a modern complaint as
shown by the prejudice -widespread among the people against
grants of corporate power and the creation of artificial persons
in commerce. This same hatred towards corporate power is
manifested in the public press, verdicts of juries, and even in some
judicial opinions have not failed to voice a warning or reprimand.
A review of the inception, history, and growth of corporate
legislation in the various States gives the impression that the
tendency of legislatures in the matter of privilege is diversity
rather than uniformity for the rivalry in the corporate business;
and creates a legislative policy to protect domestic corporations
and at the same time exercise a feeling of antagonism or belliger-
ent feeling against foreign corporations. Some States have
charters for sale and look for the initial fees of organization and
the yearly return of taxes to be assessed. By proceeding on this
basis to procure money returns they obviate sound principles of
government and measure legislation by monetary and political
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scales. Special legislation for the benefit of a particular cor-
poration is always open to the charge of being legislation for ex-
pected revenues to the State, especially if the character of such
legislation is manifestly unsound in principle. Granting charters
with unusual privileges and immunities arouses a public distrust
against the integrity of the members who compose the corpora-
tion.
To demonstrate that the people themselves are responsible for
the evils of corporate power obtained through the actions of their
legislatures, which power is frequently used for indirect and
selfish private gain, a glimpse at the following may be convinc-
ing:
Forty-two States permit the organization of corporations for
any lawful business or purpose.
Forty-three States have no superior limit on the capital stock
of the corporation.
Twenty-four States issue perpetual charters and in most of the
other States charters are limited as to time but may be renewed
again and again.
Eighteen States permit the merger and consolidation of cor-
porations and they are specially prohibited in only two States.
Nineteen States sanction holding of stock in other corporations;
it is prohibited in two States and qualified in seven States.
Forty States have no provision that any part of the capital stock
shall be paid in money, either before organization or at any period
in its existence. One State provides for the payment of $I,ooo
in money, three provide that ten per cent, one twenty per cent, one
twenty-five per cent, and one fifty per cent of the capital stock
shall be so paid.
Thirty-eight States by statute, and three by jurisprudence, pro-
vide that stock may be issued for property, and in most of them
for labor or services as well. Fourteen States declare the issue
of fictitious stock void. In nine States the judgment of the
board of directors as to the value of the property for which the
stock is issued is declared conclusive except in the case of fraud,
but the stock is not declared void. Montana permits any arbitrary
value whatever to be placed on mining property for which the
stock is issued. Massachusetts, Virginia, Iowa and Texas exer-
cise State supervision over the- issuance of stock for property.
Twenty-four States permit corporate meetings to be held either
within or without the State of incorporation.
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Thirty-three States have no provisions requiring any of the
,directors of a corporation to be residents of the creating State.
Eleven States require one director, two States require three direc-
tors, and two States require a majority of the directors to be resi-
-dents of the State of incorporation.
Twelve States require annual financial reports to be made to
the State officer. Twenty States require an annual report con-
taining nothing but certain formal matters, such as the name and
domicile of the company, the names of the directors, residences,
and the amount of the capital stock.
None of the States have provisions against the same persons
acting as directors in corporations of the same character and
engaged in the same business in the same State or in different
States.
Some corporations are organized primarily for the purpose of
doing business outside of the State which grants the charter for
incorporation.
Some corporgions are organized for the purpose of doing
without the State such business as is prohibited to be done
within the State of its creation.
Some corporations are organized for the purpose of doing
their business as corporations entirely outside of the State, being
specifically forbidden by their charters from operating or carrying
on such business in the State where organized. Some corpora-
tions are organized for the express purpose of doing business in
evasion-sometimes in violation-of the law of the State into
which the corporation intends to go and operate.
In 1866 the State of Pennsylvania granted a special charter to
the New York California Vineyard Company giving it power to
do the business set forth in its charter in any State of the United
States or Territories except in the State of Pennsylvania, as a
natural person. Later in 187o the name of the company was
changed by special act and it was given banking power to be exer-
cised in any State, Territory, or county in the United States, ex-
cept in the State of Pennsylvania. This illustrates the evil of
oppressing other States and protecting its own corporations. The
Supreme Court of Kansas (6 Kans., 255) in ousting this cor-
poration from that State said that, "At the very creation of this
corporation its creators spurned it from the land of its birth as
illegitimate and unworthy of a home among its kindred and sent
it forthwith a wanderer on foreign soil. Is the State of Kansas
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bound by, any sort of courtesy, or comity, or friendship, or kind-
ness toward Pennsylvania to treat this corporation better than its
creator? No rule of comity will allow one State to spawn cor-
porations to do outside of the State such business as it will not
allow them to do within its own boundaries." The State
of Connecticut is a close follower of Pennsylvania in creating cor-
porations to do outside of the State such business that it will not
allow to be done within its borders. This same State recently
created by special charter a banking company with power to hold
its stockholders' meetings anywhere in the world; and granted it
poiver to transact the business of merchants, manufacturers,
miners, shippers, and agents of every description, to construct
private and public works of any kind, all outside this State of
Connecticut. In contrast to this same State granting wholesale
powers for banking outside of the State, it puts a limitation on
those applying for a license to conduct a banking or trust business
in the State by compelling them to submit to the supervision of its
banking commissioners. The limitation to operate outside of the
State carefully guards the citizens and welfare of the State; and
publicity of corporate accounts and documents denied to stock-
holders by its by-laws must be wide open to publicity when oper-
ating within the State. Such acts as these made by the represen-
tatives of the people are purely impositions and should not be
tolerated for a moment.
The corporate system of New Jersey is often declared to be-
loose and lax, which assertion is probably based upon the liberal
features of the laws devised to attract enormous capital. All
corporations are created under a general incorporation law. The
policy of the executive officers connected with the business man-
agement of the administration, associated with the intelligence, in-
tegrity and high character of the Bench and Bar has given the public
confidence in the stability of the New Jersey laws. Under these
laws the Standard Oil Corporation was organized and flourished
with unlimited power, reaching the highest personification of a
stygian monopoly. This peer of monopoly, characterized as the
vilest rebater and user of secret and immoral means, has been
branded as a bad trust by the Supreme Court of the United States.
They have passed into dissolution in vaudeville style. The United
States Steel Corporation and many of its constituent companies
were organized under the laws of this same State. This State
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was preferable to any other as the laws gave them the unlimited
power to stifle competition and foster a trust-fed monopoly, This
is shown by the control and operation of steamship lines and more
than thirty railroads. Public opinion seems to disapprove the
New Jersey laws of incorporation, especially those laws which
sanction holding companies, but other States, as New York, have
attempted to legislate liberally with a view of inducing capital to
organize under its laws, that the State might receive the income
tax. Under the New York laws a perpetual corporation can
be formed with unlimited power and with the power of merger
and with the power to hold stock in other corporations for any
lawful purpose, including the power to incorporate estates, In
Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was created
with unlimited power to maintain and operate for profit a great
highway of commerce, protecting it from competition and safe-
guarding its secret and vicious methods, thereby denying to the
citizens of the State the equal privilege of transportation, The
State incorporated other railroads within the State and gave them
unlimited power to maintain and operate for profit coal mines in
the anthracite coal fields, whereby they have controlled the output
of mines and advanced prices almost to a condition of feudalism.
The very independence and natural wealth of the people they
have unqualifyingly bestowed upon these artificial persons, who
tyrannically operate them for their own personal greed. The
States of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts both take the stand
that stock must be issued for an actual money value and the courts
are the judges both as to the law and the fact of what is the
value of the property for which the stock is issued, They insist
upon publicity for all corporations, public or private, while New
Jersey has consistently adhered to the principle of priva.te pub
licity as the better policy for business corporations. Massachu-
setts insists upon an official State valuation for stock, but
New Jersey takes the position that stock can not be issued foi
services; also compels publicity by requiring the corporation in
each annual report to distinguish between stock issued for cost
and stock issued for property.
The States seem to have overlooked this evil of unlimited
power, or it has never dawned upon the respective legislatures
that the controlling power lies in the privilege of the same per-
sons acting as directors in various and similar corporations. This
express power for a corporation to hold stock in another corpora-
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tion or association gives to the holding company the unlimited and
unbridled power to regulate sales and prices. As the State laws
stand to-day these laws are simple legal machinery in the hands of
dishonest wise men to manipulate monopolies calculated to con-
centrate the wealth of the country and defraud the honest investor
of his money by various systems of watered stock. Many per-
sons bold stock in two or more corporations engaged in fierce
competition. States overlook the necessary prohibition of limit-
ing the eligibility of persons to engage in the corporate business of
more than one company, thus permitting the evil to reach out and
tighten its monstrous grasp. The combination, merger and pool-
ing arrangements have not been restricted from interlocking with
several competing companies. You can not provide that A. B.
cannot buy stock in any corporation he chooses, but you can
provide that if A. B. owns stock in two or more competitive cor-
porations he shall not have the right to vote that stock at a stock-
holders' meeting of either of them, because the State which creates
the corporation has the right to regulate and define clearly the
manner in which these artificial creatures shall hold their meet-
ings, and how the members shall vote their stock and attempt to
operate the business. Much stock is afloat over the country.
held by individuals in small quantities, who know nothing of cor-
pora;te affairs and who never attend the corporate meeting nor
voice an interest in its welfare, It is through these small stock-
holders that the officers obtain their control of corporations by
proxies.
At first corporations were creatures of the State, organized for
-public purposes and held subservient to the general welfare. Mr.
Justice Brown said that "it is presumed to be incorporated for the
benefit of the public", Charter legislation has radically changed
in recent years, and the power which was so jealously guarded by
,State officials to protect the public has been unwisely exercised.
It is well known that many of the statutes are drawn and passed
with the most obvious evidences of haste, lack of knowledge of
constitutional principles, coupled with ignorance of many of the
facts to which the statutes will apply when in the power of dis-
honest users, or of the consequences which will follow from its
operation in circumstances the makers never had the re-
motest thought ever existed. Old charters which were difficult
to- obtain, with broad and irresponsible privileges, have been sup-
.erseded by general incorporation laws permitting worse evils than
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special charters, and actually allowing or inviting any prospective
association or combination to even draw its own charter. It seems
that some States have actually auctioned their power to practically
encourage dishonest enterprises and give them a legal status, so
that if an association finds it disadvantageous to apply for a char-
ter in one State, it has the right to ptoceed to another State and
there obtain that which it was impossible to obtain in its own State.
These corporations organized to operate often have no associa-
tion with the State, and operate, own property, conduct business
and hold directors' meetings anywhere best suited for their in-
terests. They pay for incorporation and comply with the meager
requirements, such as having a home office in the State of origin,.
which has few restrictions of law; thus these "legal fictions"
evolve themselves into monsters of gluttony.
Some stockholding statutes are so unlimited in power that the
-conscience is astounded by the magnitude of legislative injustice.
One of the most noticeable of these unrestrained stockholding
.statutes was passed in the State of Utah in 19o7, amending Sec-
tion 26 of the laws of 19O1, which reform gives to the Utah rail-
road companies the power to acquire and control stock in all the
transportation companies by land, river, lake or sea in the United
States; of all terminals, wharves, docks, or other shipping facili-
ties; of all express companies; of all refrigerator plants; and of
.all other corporations that manufacture, sell, lease, or otherwise
provide railroad equipment. The State has made one limitation
that this grant of power cannot extend to the ownership of stock,
or securities of a parallel or competing line of railroad within its
boundaries. The Union Pacific Railroad is a corporation of
Utah and previous to this amendment, AkMr. Harriman, late presi-
,dent of this company, acquired stock in several other large rail-
roads, which control was deemed necessary to be protected. The
-evil of intercorporate stockholding has very recently met with
the disapprobation of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the merger dealings between the Union Pacific and Southern
Pacific Railroads. These two corporations were acting inde-
pendently as to a large amount of interstate commerce until the
,acquisition of stock, by which manipulation they attempted to
effect a combination and suppress competition between the two
systems. Railroad and industrial development originated inter-
corporate stockholding when every State felt called upon to make
inducements to facilitate large combinations of capital to advance
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enterprises. Many States did not expressly give power to hold
stock in other corporations and court decisions held that corpora-
tions had no such inherent right from merely obtaining a charter.
Only a few years ago the country was harassed by transporta-
tion companies who discriminated in freight charges and undue
preferences. Nearly all the railroads are chartered by States
which have extended concessions and powers of eminent domain
under the general incorporation laws as inducements to prospec-
tive transportation companies to secure facilities that require legal
authority. Thus the evil was not wholly the acts of the
corporations, but it is safe to say that the legislatures of the
States were responsible for such organizations whose malpractice,
extended over the entire country. These railroad corporations
originally were purely creatures confined to the States of their
birth, but soon the State limits vanished as something only imagi-
nary, and they spread over other States, becoming instruments
of interstate commerce, subject in a degree to the Act to Regulate
Commerce. Public opinion hastened Federal regulation of these
corporations with gratifying results, both to the shippers and the
owners of the railroads. There is no general Federal incorpora-
tion statute for transportation companies, although some rail-
roads were created by special acts of Congress. Much has been
said on the subject of Federal incorporation for interstate car-
riers and bills have been introduced in Congress, but they all have
come to a sad death in the committee rooms, although the busi-
ness of the railroads is so enormous and the interests of the people
affected are so far reaching that Federal regulation of railroads
is actually necessary for the general welfare. Railroads continue
to combine and merge, under State laws, for the control of traffic,
and frequently great combinations have been formulated to
restrain competition, as was attempted by the Northern Securities
Companies, which was dissolved by the Supreme Court for illegal
practices and restraint of trade (193 U. S., 361). Under the.
present regulations, railroads can establish their own rates and.
charges, or advance their rates to a reasonable degree to guarantee
profitable returns for the money invested in the property. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that railroads cannot be com-
pelled to operate their lines at a loss, neither can they charge exor--
bitant rates for transportation services. They manage to have
their rates sufficiently high to take all the traffic will bear, and:
advance rates if thought necessary to replenish the treasury. Ott
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this point of advancing rates the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion has recently declared that the general public must be consid-
ered before an advance will be permitted.
Industrial corporations owe their existence to incorporation and
are subject to the State laws regarding their issue of stocks and
bonds. At times much stock is issued at less than par value, and
often issued as bonus to promoters. Most people know that
securities are divided into two classes, stocks and bonds, although
few people really apprehend as clearly as they should their dis-
tinction, or real value. The bond obligation is definite, as it is
limited by the terms on its face and essentially amounts to a note,
or promise to pay a certain sum of money at a prescribed rate of
interest. The face value mostly determines its market value.
The share of stock is vastly different and of a more complex
nature. It represents a certain sum paid into the treasury of the
corporation and the holder has a certain share in the ownership of
the property, of whatever value that may be. This value is the
worth of the share or stock certificate. The face value of the
certificate is not a measure of its real value, but its actual value is
determined by its market value of negotiability and the develop-
ment of the property. The purchaser of stock certificates takes
his risk when he chooses his investment and management. If
the management acts wisely he fares accordingly, but should he
fare badly he must abide by the consequences. Holders of stocks
sometimes receive shares on the increased value of the property,
or in course of reorganization, or in exchange for stock of other
companies, which may not be fully warranted by the facts of the
case. The actual facts should be publicly disclosed that the true
character and valuation of the physical property may be deter-
mined. All these transactions of stocks are controlled by State
statutes, and herein lies an evil that needs a remedy. This un-
certainty of stock value often results in the issue of shares of stock
beyond the real value of the property and business, and thus the
corporation immediately becomes over-capitalized. Corporations
of great capitalization and controlling entire industries must neces-
sarily keep in close touch with the great banking and financial
interests who usually select the board of directors; consequently,
all matters of business policy are devised or approved by them.
Regulation of stock issue, credits, and the indebtedness of these
great corporations appears to be necessary for the public welfare;
especially when a bond is issued at $i,ooo and bears a thousand
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dollar mark upon its face, it should be absolute evidence to the
financial world that a thousand dollars is in the treasury of the
corporation, or it has the actual property back of it to sustain its
face value; and if a thousand dollars' worth of stock is issued, it
should signify under the law that it represents a thousand dollars
in the treasury or property of the corporation. Some law should
control these great corporations in the issue of watered stock for
which the public must pay a fair rate of interest for an uncertain
value. Also, this fictitious stock issue places an exorbitant price
on commodities, without which lower prices would prevail-
Neither would combinations develop and expand so rapidly if
their charters did not empower them to purchase sufficient shares
of stock in other corporations for the control of the business.
The most obnoxious form of intercorporate stockholding is the
holding company which undertakes to hold the stock of other cor-
porations, which is the real purpose for which it is formed. Con-
trol by holding is probably the greatest evil and cause of great
combinations in transportation affairs. This characteristic of
intercorporate stockholding, which reaches its acme in the crea-
.tion of a corporation designed for nothing but to hold stock and
securities of other corporations, is identical with a trust monopoly,
and it is by this means of intercorporate stockholding that compe-
tition is absorbed by a single control of the avenues of business
enjoyed by separate independent corporations. Thesc are purely
evil devices designed to suppress competition and deceive the
public.
Inside manipulation, inherent in corporate stock ownership,
might be prevented by eliminating the charter power of inter-
corporate stockholding. Minority rights of stockholders vanish
like a mist the moment the stock majority submerges in another
corporation, which actually has no interest in the active opera-
tions of the industry. To control the business the holding com-
pany may go so far after purchase as to close the industries, or
reduce the output to eliminate competition, and report that such in-
dustry was too expensive to operate. As a result the stock-
holder's money, intended to be used as a pure investment, is con-
verted to purchase stocks in another corporation, and his money is
handled according to the wishes of the leaders, although he is
never consulted as to the policy of the company, regardless of any-
thing like fair treatment. But we find the legal status of holding
corporations in the United States is exceedingly complicated, not
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by reason of the conflict of the organizations, but by reason of the
conflict of the dual jurisdictions of State and Federal govern-
ments. Each of these jurisdictions is by virtue of the Constitu-
tion of the United States supreme within its own particular
sphere. The Constitution gives the Federal government power
over interstate commerce and the right to interfere with the cor-
porations chartered by the States where questions of interstate
operations are involved. Thus a stockholding corporation organ-
ized under the laws of any State for the purpose of consolidating
several corporations subjects itself to State and Federal control.
The powers of Congress are construed and defined by the Supreme
Court, which forbids interference with an industry operating
wholly within one State. Much business is now conducted by
these holding corporations, and their destruction or serious dis-
turbance would involve loss to innocent stockholders for value,
hamper the employment of millions of workmen, and probably
result in conditions of general bankruptcy to the most prosperous
people and nation on earth. All components must be considered
by wise and prudent men, who attempt to formulate laws to pro-
mote the general good and not produce wholesale destruction.
With the States furnishing opportunities of which the financial
leaders of holding companies may take advantage, the dangers of
our industrial system are apt to be overlooked. Ionopoly, sanc-
tioned by the order of judges who are bound by law and every
sacred obligation to protect rights and property, stands ready to
paralyze business organizations which the States are continually
establishing. Threatened disaster must be avoided both by the
recalcitrant tactics of ironclad monopolies and radical legislation.
Honest industrial and commercial combinations are not dan-
gerous, but lawless organizations are dangerous, because these
great organizations have not been under any direct control of the
law. Greatness is not an evil, but the evil exists in the fact that
they have been exempt from regulation and control. By being
exempt from legal regulation the result has been malicious monop-
oly derived from combination. That competition is impossible when-
ever combination is possible, has been clearly demonstrated by the
development of commerce. The results of non-regulated organ-
izations and hybrid monopoly are these evils: Power to fix prices;
power to deteriorate quality; power to limit commercial" output;
power to lower wages ; and the power to destroy competition.
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The assertion is often heard that competition- is past history,
but the opinion of a few will not prevail to eliminate an inherent
element of the human race; neither can it be eliminated from the
minds of men unless you destroy that selfish motive which moves
every human being and fires his brain with financial enthusiasm.
Free competition should be open to all persons interested in busi-
ness, and they are entitled to protection in the exercise of their
respective degrees of personal industrial ability. The spirit of
competition has come down from the earliest history, when men
sought to conquer by superior power and force of arms; and this
is seen in the world of industry and business, where men wish to
attain the highest point for the satisfaction of personal superiority.
This spur of competition sometimes produces a natural monopoly
not in restraint of trade as the result of skill in one particular
class of manufacture. A manufacturer may have a natural
monopoly by producing goods of a superior quality in an open
field, as the manufacture of astronomical lenses. Here the degree
of quality makes a demand for the class of articles, and the man
who is most efficient will command the trade and the prices. In
like manner the industrial man in labor who possesses the greatest
ability will command the highest wages. The best man in indus-
trial management, or the best man on the basis of personal skill,
is the person who would be supposed to succeed when opportuni-
ties are equal. So long as the world continues, competition will
not pass, unless human nature becomes changed; then the axiom
of the survival of the fittest will be eclipsed.
By combination as a means the business of corporations is grad-
ually stifling competition; also, actual competition ma4 be
destroyed by the consolidation of corporations. The almost
instantaneous operation by which competitors are combined into
a single controlling company, accomplished by selling and buying
stocks, or the creation of a corporation authorized to hold all their
stock, cannot be termed a process of competition. The effect of
such devices and practices is not generally known by the public;
thus the pressure of public opinion has been evaded greatly and
the sham of competition maintained. Even industrial corpora-
tions have conducted a private banking business with enormous
capital which often amounts to many millions of dollars, as in-
vestigation has recently brought to light concerning the United
States Steel Corporation. All these financial resources strengthen
the purpose and generally aid the tendency toward monopoliza-
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-tion of business. This money reserve or private bank of the
-holding company is indispensable in illegitimate affairs and con-
.stitutes the source of evil and public danger.
If these corporations are allowed to come into existence, a lim-
itation of excessive capital which one corporation can properly
employ would be a step toward the preservation and maintenance
of fair competition, although the amount of capital could not
-be minutely determined on account of the wide range of business
sagacity. Between a match industry and a steel plant there is
'such an enormous range of difference that what would be con-
.sidered an excessive capital in one instance would not make an
impression for the necessary capital in the other case. Thus the
.amount of capital which one corporation can utilize without
-serious danger to its rivals varies in different cases, but a careful
survey of the field may determine just about how much capital
-can be prudently employed without unduly restraining competi-
tion. It would become too large whenever it should be discovered
that actual competitors are being unfairly driven to the wall. Of
-course, assuming the non-existence of special privilege or special
-restraint in competition, the inefficient producer must yield to the
successful producer and the limitation upon the capital might be
increased from time to time, according to the development of the
business. The large independent corporations and the original
trusts, if there were no dissolutions into fragments, should com-
pete reasonably with each other if both are subject to a rule pro-
hibiting all unfair practice in competition.
The "trust" acquired an unenviable prominence in the eighties
.-and became.the familiar and common expression for a combina-
tion of competing interests under one management. Today
and for many years past the so-called trust in its original sense
-has become rare, but the expression survives and has assumed a
.generic significance as indicating -every form of combination of
competing industries.. The original trust was, as will be remern-
bered, an arrangement whereby a number of competing manufac-
-turers, individual or corporate, while retaining their indi-
vidual or corporate ownership of their respective- proper-
-ties, put into the bands of trustees their interests; the trustees
-being clothed with the right to dictate to the respective competi-
tors the terms on which they should compete, the amount and
-character of their output, and the prices at which the output
-should be sold. The appellation soon became a term of oppro-
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brium and has so remained. The large combinatiohs of capitar
which now exist in various branches of industry have inheritect
the opprobrium attaching to this term. To call a corporation a
trust is to excite public condemnation and to put the combination:
or corporation on the defensive. The corporations that pur-
chase materials by hammering prices and whose unpardonable
crime is stifling competition; whose conception of sales is to
obtain the last cent by force from their purchasers; who practice
the evil of secrecy concerning trade operations; who have no-
regard for the producer of raw materials as long as he produces;
and who resort to ruthless and drastic methods to drive competi-
tors from the business, such as the American Tobacco Company
or the Standard Oil Company, are illustrations of bad trusts anct
evils of special privilege which had their inception and organiza-
tion under State incorporation statutes.
That a merely permissive Federal incorporation statute woulct
be of little value is manifest because only those corporations which
thought they might secure some advantages through Federal incor--
poration would resort to it, while if they thought they could profit
better by. State incorporation they would not submit them-
selves to Federal jurisdiction, and therefore it would be
an option solely for the advantage of the corporation. In-
stead of being merely permissive it should be compulsory,
and if permissive, only such corporations would come under
its provisions voluntarily as sought an avenue to escape
the general condemnation that is threatening their business and
credit. Many corporations that are now doing business, which
have been organized under the laws of the respective States, might
find it difficult to remove themselves from the obligations that
they have already incurred to the State and resort to Federal in-
corporation and regulation. In the instance of a State bank
which desides to change its status into a national bank, it must sur-
render its charter or franchise under which it transacted business ;
and most States will require a complete dissolution and winding
up of its affairs generally before the State will release its obli-
gation. Too radical legislation may work an unexpected hard-
ship upon the innocent.
All the monopoly cases decided by the Supreme Court had their
origin in some State where the statutes knew no limitations for
breadth of power. These individual ills began by the negligent
exercise of legislative authority when these respected bodies by
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some irresistible lure or indomitable power were forced 
into ser-
vile submission of those inalienable rights inherited by 
the people
from the beginning of government. The evils exist in 
abund-
ance, although corporate powers are constantly expanded. 
Un-
limited delegation of power under State government has 
made
many existing evils possible. The State is a sovereignty of 
almost
unlimited power and fully able to enact statutes limiting 
the
powers of corporations. A return to the original conception 
of
a corporation subservient to the public good rather than for 
public
oppression would be very acceptable if such could be possible.
Although a corporation is an individual in the union of 
States and
has a perfect right to seek its fortune anywhere, it should 
not with
legal impunity exercise its power to injure the individuals or 
pub-
lic policy of allied States. Conservative business men are 
awake
to the danger of impatience among the public for a more equal
condition in business affairs, and these men are seeking a sover-
eign remedy for the evils that will not result in disaster to 
indi-
vidual prosperity. Many of the large corporations can not afford
to be subject to the divergent laws of various States and no 
doubt
the better class of corporations would welcome some prudent
national regulation.
J. Newton Baker.
District of Columbia Bar.
